TEHKE WACCO Biography

According to the existing rules for writing a scientific treatise, the proper presentation of my views requires their comparison with all significant similar or excellent points of view, put forward in the psychoanalytic literature to the present. However, since the theme of my discussion, apparently, in almost its entirety covers psychoanalytic evolutionary psychology, following this principle is clearly impossible in the limited framework of my work.

The compromise is probably to compare my thoughts with all previous ideas and finds in this area. To make this view in general possible, I carried out such comparisons only occasionally. I am also aware of the risk that, due to the abundance of literature related to the case, I can involuntarily put up some ideas as my own, which, regardless of me, have already been expressed earlier than other authors.

Bringing my apologies for the inevitable omissions and any unintentional plagiarism, due to my way of representing the material, I nevertheless now not know any other way to give a personal and coherent outline of the development of the human psyche in a brief and logically consistent form. Some general principles The concept of “mental formation” has in this context the attitude to the emergence and development of mental experience in the human world.

I do not want to use the usual expression “inner world”, contrasting it with “external reality”. Distinction between the inner and external world means that the individual learns to conduct in his empirical world, at first rudely, and then with ever -increasing differentiation, the border between two sets of perceptions and ideas. Although the quality of the “insides” is attributed to one such set, and the other - “appearance”, both of them continue to belong to the world of the individual’s mental experience, considered here as a synonymous psyche.

This should not be mistaken for the solipsic thesis about the existence of the world only as a product of the psyche, and rather, as a constitution of the simple fact that all the knowledge of the human individual about the world is based on his mental experience. The concept of the psyche includes everything that is experienced mentally, and excludes everything that is not experienced in this way.

In the preparation of this essay on the early formation of the psyche, two leading principles were constantly used: firstly, the need to realize the widespread spread of adults and formulations in psychoanalytic theories of early development, and secondly, the constant need for a dynamic point of view in such a theory. The adult here refers to the explanation of mental processes and behavior in terms of abilities, characteristic features and structures, which, obviously or probably, have not yet been formed at this stage of development.

Adultness is also manifested as incorrect usage, so that early evolutionary phenomena are described by the words that usually characterize phenomena related to much later stages of development. An example of such a usage is the illegible use of the term love in relation to the earliest forms of libidinous connectedness of Blanck and Blanck, the causes of adult incorrect interpretations are associated with the difficulties inherent in the methods through which psychoanalytic knowledge of early development, as well as the concern of the observer and with obstacles to the sensation of empathy, When personality with absent or poorly developed structures is in front of him.

In this work, special efforts have been made in order to avoid such a tendency to adultness, and some of its obvious manifestations in the existing theory are noted. The emphasis of the important significance of the dynamic point of view in the psychoanalytic theory of the early formation of the psyche is caused by the fact that this point of view has a relatively neglected status in the most important theories of this kind of Schafer, the views represented in them usually include a genetic point of view, as a rule, by describing the sequence of various stages of development; The economic point of view - by describing the change in the distribution of catexes during development; The structural point of view - by describing the appearance and differentiation of three mental macrostructures, as well as an adaptive point of view - by describing the more successful and realistic ways of response to the requirements of the outside world.

Apparently, only the dynamic point of view is not sufficiently represented in these theories: t. In many decisive points, these theories are limited to a description of what is happening without trying to explain why this step in development takes place. Such concepts may relate to the case when considering certain general principles and descriptive aspects of development, but in relation to the motivation of various transitions in development, they are undoubtedly pseudo -clarifying.The same can be said about attempts to circumvent the need for a dynamic explanation by the name of the phenomenon in question and the subsequent use of this name in the quality of the explanation.

For example, the assertion of the type of “merging of the idea of ​​a good and bad object makes it possible to know the objects as a whole” remains a simple description until nothing is said about what such a “merger” is due. In order to avoid replacing the dynamic explanation with pseudo-clarifying descriptions and concepts, special efforts were made in this study aimed at the rejection of any postulates about development without inspiring dynamic or motivational justification.

The beginning of the assumptions that attribute psychological knowledge and various innate mental qualities and functions of a newborn baby are more to the field of faith than knowledge. In addition, such postulates carry the danger of using protective adult structures aimed rather at filling the frightening empirical vacuum than to a description of the actual circumstances.

Personally, I share the point of view of those authors, according to which, despite the vast specific and individual capabilities of newborn human individuals, the beginning of human life is extremely likely to be the purely physiological existence of Freud, A; Spitz, the organs of the perception of a newborn baby are capable of in principle to receive sensory stimulation, but the processes of reception at first do not yet have any psychological meaning.

Since such the initial lack of meaningful caketty perceptions, apparently, in itself very effectively protects the baby from flooding with the frustrating stimulation of Spitz, the postulation of any other varieties of the barrier to the mental stimulus seems unnecessary. The initial absence of meaningful perceptions and their mnemoic registration also suggests that the first reactions of the baby to increasing and decreasing tension in the body cannot yet be accompanied by appropriate affective perceptions.

Affects as psychological phenomena are inconceivable before the beginning of the existence in one form or another of the perceiving psyche. Therefore, the postulates about innate affects are represented by insolvent. Primitive physiological perceptions of stress and its discharge can best be described by terms such as the organismic disorder of Mahler, and, as I propose to call it, organismic relief.

The first and most primitive forms of the psyche, apparently, consist of the first meaningful perceptions, recorded as the first primitive engrams. Their parish is marked by the appearance of psychological perception, although it is still only in the object sense. In the empirical world of a baby there is still no subject who would perceive himself as a subject separate from perceived objects.

Thus, the first mnemoic registrations take place in an absolutely undifferentiated empirical sphere, and usually only from the second half of the first year of life there are evidence that the mental perceptions of the baby were grouped into the first gross dumplings [3-self-“self”, “own self”, “self-”, “self”. This basic differentiation of self -assembly and object representations only makes it possible to separate the perception of the one who perceives, and what is perceived.

Only then the subject is born and psychological perception becomes possible even in the subjective sense. It is important to realize that even if the perception of the act of perception itself implies the division that has occurred in the infantic empirical world into a perceiving one and perceived object, this does not exclude the fact that a mentally perceiving subject existed within a few months before such differentiation.

The displayed materials should have been built in the empirical world before they could be grouped and divided into self -sedimentary and object perceptions. It seems likely that the first such differentiation does not occur gradually, but relatively suddenly, like an evolutionary jump, when sufficient accumulation of the undifferentiated displayed material is achieved. The secondary of the perception of my own Self in relation to the undifferentiated subjective perception obviously assumes that the early appearance of the psychological method of perception passes through two consistent evolutionary stages.

The first is characterized by increasing accumulation of the recorded mnemoic material, but so far in the absence of differentiation between self -sides and object representations, internal and external. After the primary dedicated and object differentiation, objectively characterized by the emergence of a previously unfamiliar Spitz anxiety, the second level of psychological perception and subjectively dopsychological existence is replaced by the birth of a subject living in the world.Earlier, I assumed Tahka that the greatest difficulty when trying to get closer to understanding the earliest stages of mental development is the impossibility of an adult observer to feel in those ways of perception where there is still no differentiation between the perception of a duplicate and object.

The decisive prerequisite for empathic understanding is the possibility of temporary identification with the perceiving one of the other person, even if he perceives his own self, only roughly formed and primitively. If this is my own, I have not yet arisen in the empirical world of another person or if he lost it due to regression, such an empirical world cannot be understood through empathy.

However, our need to understand the world of the experience of another person, whether it is the world of experience of a subjectively dopsychological baby or a seriously ill psychotic patient, with the inability to comprehend the inner world of another person, without the perception of his own Self, makes us tended to endow this world with the contents and qualities with which identification can be carried out.

This phenomenon, which I called the “myth of the primary self” Tahka, is everywhere widespread in the psychoanalytic theories of the early development of the psyche. Even the authors, clearly expressing the point of view that dumping and object representations appear from the previously registered empirical material only in the second half of the first year of life, nevertheless and again put forward formulations and hypotheses, clearly implying the primary or very early existence of a baby who perceives their own self in the empirical world.

Some examples of the action of this “myth of the primary self” with the implied primary awareness of the external and internal are represented by the concept of partial objects; postulation of very early forms of anxiety or primary projective and introctative mechanisms; consideration of the smiling response of the baby as a social phenomenon; the postulate of the desire to merge with the mother; confusion of chaos with creativity in chaotic perception; The belief that through genetic interpretations can be approached and come into contact with a person who regressed the subjectively dopsychological existence.

We will return to most of these issues later in this chapter. The meaning of assuming that the life of a newborn is characterized by a purely physiological perception, then, apparently, the following question is the most appropriate: what is motivated by the emergence of “psychology” in the world of perception of the baby and what gives psychological meaning to the original processes of sensory reception?

The energy accumulating in the young human body can only partially be discharged through the physiological channels of Freud, a; jacobson, while its main mass, apparently, needs the processes of reducing stress, which are possible only in interactions with the object world. It is very likely that such a decrease in tension during interactions, objectively obvious from the very beginning, will be primarily tested in the empirical world of the baby as a physiological “organismic relief”, and then as an undifferentiated “pleasure from satisfaction”, which is already a psychological phenomenon and which, in turn, should be tested as a result of interactions even subjectively.

However, this last stage, apparently, becomes possible in a primitive form only in the second half of the first year of life. Since an adequate reduction in constantly repeating stresses of stress is significantly important for the survival of a love of a living creature, ensuring such a decrease in stress is apparently the first existential necessity of a newborn human body.

Therefore, everything that in the empirical world of the baby is associated with the first perceptions of tension reduction is vital information for the body and, therefore, becomes eagerly recorded and used. Thus, psychology probably arises around perceptions, which at first have the nature of purely physiological relief. It seems likely that the sensory input, which occurs simultaneously with repeated sensations of organismic deployment, gives rise to the first meaningful perceptions recorded as the first comprehensive engrams of Freud, this first mnemonic registration of meaningful perception notes the birth of the psyche and represents its first and most primitive form.

While the first building blocks of the psyche can be understood as fragmentary and undifferentiated mnemonic sensations that accompany the perception of the voltage reduction and primitive forms of satisfaction, it seems plausible that the subsequent construction of the psyche will be based exclusively on the perceptions of satisfaction until self -cooting and object differentiation in the second half of the first year of life.The point of view of Mahler and Gosliner expressed by many authors; Jacobson,; Mahler,; Kernberg,,; Mahler, Pine and Bergman, according to which painful perceptions also from the very beginning participate in the formation of the perceived world of Sandier and Rosenblatt, seemed to me based on an adult incorrect interpretation of the still undifferentiated method of perception.

What at the very beginning will motivate sensory perceptions associated with an organismic disorder so that they become chatted with meaning?

It is vital only to reduce tension, and therefore any information about the premises of this is also vital. Hence, in all likelihood, the increase in the stock of undifferentiated primitive memories of satisfaction, while the corresponding memories of painful perceptions are not seen subsequently and in no way accelerate the processes of reducing stress.

As noted above, survival and decrease in tension are obviously the first goals of the blind body at the beginning of human life. The recently born baby has no human goals yet; They arise only in connection with the gradual formation of the psyche and require that in the empirical world of the baby there is a differentiation of self-plating and object representations, because before that the accumulation of perceptions can hardly have any other motive, except for the increase and storage of information regarding the conditions for reducing stress and early forms of satisfaction.

Therefore, probably, only the sensations associated with satisfaction become meaningful and are recorded until their sufficient accumulation makes the empirical differentiation of the subject and object. Only when there is someone who is undergoing displeasure in the divided world of perception, can frustration become mentally represented by Tahka, instead of generating their own mental representations, painful increase in voltage at the stage of undifferentiated perception is clearly activating existing ideas about the satisfaction of perceptions in hallucinatory forms of Freud, delays or violations of the required Thus, the “memories” of previous satisfaction instead of any corresponding mnemonic registration of previous painful perceptions are mobilizing satisfaction.

Thus, it seems likely that during the first half of the life of the increase in tension and frustrating physiological states that cannot be dealt with through real or hallucinatory perceptions of reduction of stress and the required satisfaction, will remain in the field of physiological perception. Instead of mental representations, painful perceptions at the physiological level will then probably be given to conditional reflexes aimed at avoiding repeated or long -term states of the unjurganismic disorder.

This can leave long imprintings at this level of perception in the form of connections, sewers and physiological discharge processes that can make a basis and give rise to psychosomatic disorders. It is especially appropriate to recall the well-known figurative emptiness of psychosomatic symptoms, apparently suggesting their occurrence from the stage of perception, when painful perceptions do not yet give rise to mental images, but they are still treated as purely physiological processes and psychologically unrelated reflexes.

The assumption that painful perceptions do not become mentally displayed at the stage of undifferentiated perception is also confirmed by a well -known fact: the results of disorders that arise during the interactions between the baby and his mother during the first six months of life are constantly perceived as physiological disorders and somatic states in the first Spitz, the known statement of Freud; e, in the unconscious there is no denial is also appropriate in this regard.

It may correspond to the position put forward here that the earliest precipitation of the mental representation does not contain mnemonic registration of pain or frustration. Therefore, it seems to me that the earliest psychology is exclusively the psychology of satisfaction, and the undifferentiated psyche is still a pure design of pleasure. Before someone in the empirical world is upset by something, an undifferentiated subject has neither motives, nor ways to recording pain and displeasure psychologically.

The first recorded perceptions associated with a decrease in stress may occur in the intraoral cavity of the baby and are probably vague and vague in nature Spitz, however, each new perception of tension and initial satisfaction brings an additional sensory material that can be added to the already stored enramlings.The accumulating “memories of satisfaction” will be increased in an increasing degree of all existing sensual modalities, progressively expanding both in general and in detail.

Such an increase in the mnemoically recorded information about the conditions of satisfaction is probably capturing the fragmentary aspects of the future self and the future object, still undifferentiated and mixed with each other. The illegible nature of the smiling response of a three -month -old child Spitz, well demonstrates this state of the empirical world at the stage when there is already a sufficient amount of mnemonic registration of previous satisfaction to include the gross visual engram of the human face.

Responding to this visual scheme, the child reacts not to the object, but to an undifferentiated memory of satisfaction, reinforced by the appearance of one of its fragmented aspects. Thus, the onset of a smiling response can be a favorable sign of the early history of adequate satisfaction of the need and its preservation, but does not mean any “social” establishment of kinship until he smiling response becomes selective several months later.

If it is assumed that the first method of processes -perception and, accordingly, the first world of expansion of representations remains undifferentiated in essence until the second half of the first year of life, then Freud’s early constructions as “initial reality of the ego” Freud, and the “pure pleasure of the ego” Freud, and. According to earlier, the very lack of an empirical difference between themselves and the object, the internal and external in the world of the perceptions of the baby, makes it inaccessible to empathy and therefore especially subject to adult constructions.

I already tried to show Tahka in another work, that a good example of such an adult structure is a widely accepted idea of ​​the “stages of partial objects” of Spitz, which occur between the non -butt -object stage and the self -deficiency and object differentiation. Various authors of Jacobson; Mahler et al. In addition to the condition that the perceiving one and perceived object will arise and deploy mainly from the total mass of undifferentiated perceptions, the concept of partial objects is logically erroneous.

Such a perception would be conceivable only if we assume that there is a kind of primary self, which gradually begins to perceive objects, first in parts, and then as whole. Without such an alleged “primary own self,” partial objects cannot be perceived before the idea of ​​an integral object was separated from the idea of ​​an integral own I.